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Regular readers will know that corporate subsidies — defined broadly as public funds given to a specific corporation to locate a facility somewhere, or programs that are meant to encourage a certain form of economic activity — fail at their most basic goals. Think Foxconn’s disastrous deal with Wisconsin, a sports stadium subsidy package for an NFL team, or a film/TV tax credit program.
There are reams of evidence, whole books even, showing that these “incentives” provided in the name of economic development don’t meaningfully increase GDP, create jobs, reduce poverty, or fulfill any of their other promises.
Why then, do they not only persist as a policy tool, but suck up a substantial and growing percentage of state and local budgets? The short answer: Politics.
More specifically, there’s a heap of political science — which I’m going to run through quickly today — showing that elected officials reap political rewards from their corporate incentive dealing, and not just in the corruption-worthy form of campaign donations and endorsements, but literal votes on Election Day. So while the economic incentive for these political actors may be to stop engaging in likely-to-fail policy actions, the political incentives push them to keep the corporate handouts flowing.
Let’s start here: A 2014 study from Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky, Mariana Medina, and Ugur Ozdemir found a meaningful vote bonus for governors who engage in corporate subsidy dealmaking. In general, they receive a vote uptick for securing new business investment in their state, which goes up by an additional 1.4 percent if they offered a corporate subsidy. And the vote bonus is 5.6 percent with independent voters.
Interestingly, the vote boost is even higher if the project ultimately lands somewhere else, so long as the governor in question tried to make it happen:
More strikingly, however, the use of incentives protects against downside risk. The vote bonus for the use of incentives is actually higher for a governor whose states lost the project (about 3.5% from all respondents, 11.2% from independents). Thus, whether or not the policy was effective, the tax incentive allows the governor to take credit for investment attraction that may be only loosely tied to her actions; and, if need be, deflect blame for a loss by claiming that she was engaged in the negotiation and actively working on behalf of citizens. No other policy action by a governor can play this immediate role.
The authors add, “even if tax incentives have no impact on investment decisions and firms have already decided on their location, governors in states ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ the new investment can maximize their chances of winning reelection by offering tax incentives.”
In a separate study, Jensen and Malesky found that directly elected mayors offered larger incentives and engaged in weaker oversight of corporate subsidies than did appointed city managers, furthering the notion that it’s political benefits, rather than economic ones, driving these decisions — otherwise, appointed officials would engage in the same actions, as they would improve the local economy, rather than making them look incompetent when they spent a lot of money and got nothing for it.
Another 2022 study (from the same researchers who found the connections between corporate subsidies and lobbying that we recently highlighted here) also found that “large development incentives create substantial benefits for incumbent politicians in the form of both higher campaign contributions (particularly from business, labor, and construction sectors) and higher margins of victory at election time.” Meanwhile, a 2020 study found that one of the most predictive factors for whether a state will increase its corporate subsidy spending in a given year is whether or not the incumbent governor is up for re-election.
The mechanism behind these results is all the politicking that surrounds a corporate subsidy deal: A press release announcing purported job creation, glowing write-ups in the media, getting to attend a ribbon-cutting and having your photo taken holding a golden shovel and wearing a hard hat, and then running that footage in a campaign ad. All of those are worth something in the political realm, providing the impression that the politician in question is taking positive steps for his or her constituents.
Corporate consultants have also gotten very good at ensuring they give due credit to all the political actors in and around one of their deals, ensuring that these effects take place. (And the campaign contributions that follow surely help, too.)
Not that all of the evidence weighs in this direction, mind you. Another study by Jensen and two other researchers across 3,000 municipalities found “no greater tendency to offer incentives for investment anticipated prior to than after elections — a null result that is estimated with high precision.” But it’s clear politicians believe there is political value in everything I’ve described above. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t spend so much time on it.
This all may make it seem like voters are to blame for the faults and failures of U.S. economic development, but that’s not what I’m arguing. Busy working people shouldn’t have to plumb the depths of academic journals and auditor reports to discover if the things their leaders are saying and doing actually comport with best economic policy practices, especially when the effects of any economic development effort usually takes years to develop. This is a problem driven my media, elites, and the policymaking blob of corporate consultants, construction unions, and on-the-take NGOs that surround them.
In fact, it’s voters and community members who are responsible for those rare instances when things swing the other way. Indeed, the contrast that helps prove the rule I’ve described above is the current political debate surrounding data center subsidies. Those, clearly, have become deeply unpopular with voters across the country, and the political calculation many pols are making is that going to bat for the data center industry is not worth it anymore, even if doing so provides some of the traditional upside associated with economic development projects — the press release, the photos, etc.
A similar dynamic occurred in the 2010s with film/TV production tax credits, when being associated with spending public money on Hollywood vanity projects and random celebrity perks became a political liability, and states began cutting back. (Unfortunately, that trend has reversed in recent years.)
Occasionally, then, a particular project or genre of development effort becomes politically toxic enough that it tips the scales away from the traditional benefits politicians reap from their dealmaking. The trick, then — which is much easier typed than done, to be clear — is applying that toxicity to a greater range of projects, or even more hopefully, to the whole way in which economic development is currently practiced in the U.S.
SIMPLY STATED: Here are links to a few stories that caught my eye this week.
The chairman of JobsOhio, a privatized economic development agency, also allegedly lobbied for Intel, which received JobsOhio funding.
Maryland’s first-in-the-nation digital ad tax was struck down for violating the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act.
Louisiana’s utility regulator blocked the release of information about a major Meta data center project.
Seattle unanimously adopted an ordinance banning junk fees in rental housing.
As it always goes: “Tennessee’s lottery-funded scholarship program faces revenue shortfalls” (Background on this issue here.)
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— Pat Garofalo

One of the most insightful observations I've read in a long time: "Busy working people shouldn’t have to plumb the depths of academic journals and auditor reports to discover if the things their leaders are saying and doing actually comport with best economic policy practices…This is a problem driven [b]y media, elites, and the policymaking blob of corporate consultants, construction unions, and on-the-take NGOs that surround them." Brilliant summation of the political economy of life in America. So, who will do the work we all need to sustain our dying democracy? Another great insight: “In fact, it’s voters and community members who are responsible for those rare instances when things swing the other way.” I think that captures what’s happening to the Democratic Party, where activists are fiercely organizing and supporting candidates to take on everything from corporate monopolies to data centers, while dismissing candidates whose ideas have been part of the party’s DNA since Jimmy Carter. Fortunately, I'm retired, so I take advantage of my time to plumb behind the wall of the bullshit mouthed by AI tech bros, the military, and Wall Street financiers. And I know I am not alone. We are all in this together.